
When liberals criticize the Koch brothers and conservatives criticize George Soros, though their motives may be political, they are tapping into a universal distrust of the wealthy's undue influence on our collective destiny. As a nation founded on the principle that all men were created equal, plutocracy doesn't sit well with most Americans.
It would be hugely controversial if, say, Matty Moroun or Google or even downtown's patron saint Dan Gilbert, overtly offered support for a good cause only if they could first extract some significant public policy concession.
However, as William Schambra of the conservative Hudson Institute writes in "The Chronicle of Philanthropy," that is exactly what major foundations are doing with their DIA-pensions grand bargain--using their wealth to control public policy.
Philanthropy.com: The equally unusual “take” is the insistence that the funds will not be forthcoming unless a broad range of private and public institutions meet certain conditions. This crosses a line between merely seeking and blatantly demanding responses from potential grantees, including public agencies that should be answerable only to the voters. Such philanthropic coercion may not sit well with the American people.
Although the philanthropies, including the Kresge, Ford, Charles Stewart Mott, and John S. and James L. Knight foundations, have been patting themselves on the back for the bold initiative, in fact it came in response to a solicitation from Gerald Rosen, the federal judge mediating the city’s bankruptcy case.
Of course, Detroit's bankruptcy is an extraordinary circumstance. The very fact that it took the largest municipal bankruptcy in American history before the foundation community attempted to bend public policy, one could argue, sets a bar so high that in normal circumstances the influence of these organizations would return to, well, to normal.
One might also note that Schambra's employer, the Hudson Institute, is precisely the sort of group that believes the world would be a better place if public sector employees had their benefits and bargaining power curtailed.
But Schambra also points to other situations where foundations are wielding almost-oligarchical levels of influence.
It has become a “best practice” for philanthropy not only to lobby government for the adoption of its policy recommendations but to be ever more overt and aggressive in doing so. In education reform, for instance, foundations are no longer content simply to influence its general direction but have gone so far as to insist on the continued tenure of a specific administrator, no matter the preferences of city government or voters.
And that is, absolutely, problematic.